

## Corruption Loops in Indonesia During 2004-2019 (The Need for Protection Whistleblower)

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### ABSTRACT

In Indonesia, corruption occurs in all state institutions, including the executive, legislative and judiciary. The division of powers that are expected to carry out their respective functions is actually used as mutually reinforcing to commit corruption. The purpose of this study is to analyze how big the corruption loophole is in Indonesia. The method used in this study uses a literature study approach from various references. The results of the study show that although various efforts have been made by the government to eradicate corruption, corruption is still rampant. The data shows that the five highest ranks of corruption by profession/position are Private with 287, Member of DPR & DPRD 257, Echelon I/II/III 213, Other 141 and Major/Regent and Deputy 115. Plus the lack of role models at the top makes employees lower levels are also entangled in the vortex of corruption. There are many loopholes for corruption in Indonesia, protection for the role of whistleblowers and proper handling are needed to create a deterrent effect for corruptors. The imposition of severe sanctions for corruptors is only life imprisonment or death penalty, so that those concerned cannot nominate again as regional heads, members of the DPR/DPRD/DPD, President and Vice President.

**Keywords:** Corruption, Sanctions, Governance, Preventive Measures, Whistleblower

## **INTRODUCTION**

Bribery, conflicts of interest, economic coercion, and giving illegal gifts are all examples of corrupt behavior, which is an illegal conduct intended to profit oneself or others (Suradi: 2006). Meanwhile, corruption is a crime against the law (Pasal 1 angka 1 UU Nomor 30 Tahun 2002). The causes of criminal acts of corruption, among others: Low income for civil servants, consumerism mentality, weak public oversight, recruitment of state officials and civil servants who do not pay attention to personal integrity and devotion to God Almighty and weak law enforcement encourage people with weak faith to abuse their power (Ka'bah, 2007). According to Musa, Sondakh, Kumendong and Waha (2022), when a government official commits an act against formal law and is detrimental state finances, they are threatened with anti-corruption laws.

Corruption that has occurred in BUMN as one of the actors in providing public services has become fertile ground for corrupt practices. This results from a bureaucratic structure that is unhealthy and the less-than-ideal application of the Good Corporate Governance Principles. These problems require the formulation of appropriate corruption prevention policies, especially for the BUMN Sector in the context of providing public services. The formulations include: (1) the Board of Directors pays attention to the routine habits of BUMN employees, (2) Functions the BUMN internal supervisory unit, (3) Functions the community as an external supervisor through the electronic public service mechanism. In addition, it can be done by socializing the Pancasila Ethics to BUMN employees (Aslam, 2022).

The potential for corruption in the management of village funds greatly affects the village government, for example in terms of making RAB that is not in accordance with the existing agreement, the village head who is responsible for financing the building of village funds by transferring village funds to a personal account which is then not returned, cutting village funds by unscrupulous persons, making fictitious official trips, marking up the payment of village officials' honorariums, paying ATK that does not match the real cost, collecting taxes whose results are not entered into the tax office, purchasing office inventory with village funds but for personal interests. Additionally, identifying corruption's modes of operation, stepping up capacity building (Village apparatus), and enhancing the capacities of village assistants are all efforts made to combat corruption in the management of village funds. (Moonti & Kadir, 2018).

The urgency of increasing community participation in preventing corruption is to raise the standard of public services provided in the village, where poverty rates are still high. Access to proper program information and village budgets are two actions that can be taken to boost community involvement in preventing corruption in the management of village money and enhance the quality of public services in the village, along with awareness for community participation, access to communication with village officials by the community, optimization of village organizations. , and optimizing the role of the Village Consultative Body in channeling community aspirations and supervising the running of village government (Zakariya, 2019).

Although the efforts made by the government as a form of attention to the issue of corruption have been carried out since the Orla era through various regulations. However, corrupt behavior is still rampant until now, even those who understand the law do not stop their intention to commit corruption. According to Oktavianto and Abheseka (2009), regulations still provide gaps for corruption. Fariz (2019) stated that the eradication of corruption can work if the leader has a strong will. The problem is that the Jokowi-JK government's anti-corruption policy is different from that of the KPK. Lack of initiative and only concern with the investment and licensing sector. The issue of corruption is only in matters of petty corruption. The eradication of corruption is only a

technical issue, it is apolitical, whereas corruption is a political issue. The political backlash against the KPK over the past five years is clear. Starting from the use of the right of inquiry to the revision of the KPK Law. Terror and intimidation against KPK stakeholders have not been legally disclosed. The fluctuations in the president's support for the KPK are clear, this anti-corruption organization is in a state of emergency despite the absence of substantial support from the president and the intensification of political attacks against the KPK.

Corruption that develops within government institutions and by the ranks of government officials has been known by most of the public. Citizens also know the variety and types of corrupt activities carried out by the perpetrators. Corruption also committed by members of the public and by business and trade actors has also been known by some people. People in rural areas and in urban areas (in the villages and sub-districts where the research is located) do not differ in their knowledge of the development and spread of corruption (Soemanto et al., 2014).

Payments that are still manual tend to result in errors and duplication of payments, such as payment of employee salaries, and so on. In addition, manual payments can lead to deductions in the salaries of the apparatus by reason of the absence of a certain amount of change. Legally, this action constitutes corrupt behavior (Habaora, Riwukore, Manafe, Susanto, & Yustini, 2020). Oktavianto and Abheseka (2009), The inculcation of anti-corruption values will be effective through the role of the family and the social environment as a control mechanism. Family and social environment play a big role in shaping individual character. The KPK can use families and communities as agents of corruption prevention. Eradicating corruption is not only a matter for the KPK and law enforcement (police and prosecutors), but is our collective responsibility as children of the nation. Even the commitment not to commit corruption can be started from within oneself to break the chain of this problem. The purpose of this research is to analyze how big the gap in corruption is in Indonesia

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

Indonesia is a constitutional state (Article 1 Paragraph 3 of the 1945 Constitution), while law enforcement by the government or state institutions acting to guarantee justice or a tool of state power is still weak. One of the causes of weak law enforcement in Indonesia is the quality of law enforcers, low morality resulting in a lack of professionalism and an unwillingness of law enforcers. This morality is also related to corruption by law enforcers (judicial corruption). Law enforcers who are supposed to uphold the law are actually involved in corrupt practices. This low morality is why law enforcement in Indonesia is still weak. According to Transparency International, corruption is the behavior of public officials, politicians/politicians, and civil servants who unfairly and illegally enrich themselves or enrich those close to them by abusing the public power entrusted to them (Shoim, 2009). If enlarged from the sophistication of the modus operandi, the class of people involved, and a large number of funds plundered, it is clear that corruption is a high-class crime motivated by the wrong principle; namely, greed is beautiful (Fuady, 2004). In criminal law, if there is an error, the perpetrator of the crime must be held responsible (Sari, 2017).

Corruption is a crime committed by bribery, processing, and unlawful acts that harm or can harm the state's finances or the country's economy, harm the welfare or interests of the people (Beridiansyah, 2017). Corruption is behavior that benefits self-interest at the expense of others by government officials who directly violate the legal boundaries of this behavior (Hafidz, 2015). Klitgaard in Hafidz (2015) sees corruption as behavior that deviates from the official duties of a state position because of status gains or money

involving individuals (individuals, close family, own groups) that violate the rules (Hafidz, 2015).

Basically, corruption is understood as an act of a public official who abuses authority for personal, family, crony, and group interests, resulting in state losses. The most important effort to eradicate corruption is the "moral" movement which continuously promotes that corruption is a grave crime against humanity that violates human dignity. Through the moral movement, it is hoped that a social environment will be created that strongly rejects, opposes, and punishes acts of corruption and will accept, support, and appreciate anti-corruption behavior (Saifuddin, 2017). The importance of the existence of Whistle-Blowers who dare to tell the truth will be able to break the chain of criminal acts of corruption and legal mafia, so it is only natural that Whistle-Blowers must get legal protection.

The problem that is often faced by a Whistle-Blower is not getting appreciation, the lack of support, protection, let alone adequate respect or appreciation for them (Anwar Usman, and A.M. Mujahidin, 2014). Weak guarantees of legal protection for the important role of a Whistle-Blower in the criminal justice process in order to reveal the material truth of a crime, it is necessary to have a legal rule that clearly and explicitly regulates protection for Whistle-Blowers. The appropriate forms of protection for Whistle-Blowers in the settlement of corruption are: repressive protection; preventive protection; physical and psychological protection; and legal protection (Astuti, 2014). Corruption occurs because there is an agreement between the two parties, this is stated by Loppa (2001), even though officials want to commit corruption, but if it is not welcomed by employers in the form of giving bribes or promises of giving rewards, corruption will not be as bad as it is today. Another thing is the legislative function according to Article 20A of the 1945 Constitution, the DPR RI has legislative, budgetary and supervisory functions which often do not work according to what should have added to the spread of corruption so far.

## **RESEARCH METHOD**

The method uses a literature research approach (library research) from various references, which include data from KPK. The data collected is relevant to the title, which is secondary and then analyzed. Data Analysis Techniques use qualitative analysis techniques in an inductive way related to specific and concrete facts of events and then conclude the general to the specific. The data was obtained from KPK data that was already inkrah, then combined with various journals on corruption and to analyze it, it was linked to various relevant literature.

## **RESULTS**

In Indonesia, corrupt behavior occurs not only in the executive but also in the legislature, even the judiciary, and the public (private, corporate) who have an interest. This can be seen in table 1.

**Table 1.** Corruption Crimes by Profession/Position

No	Position	Year																Amount
		04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
1	Private	1	4	5	3	12	11	8	10	16	24	11	8	28	28	56	49	287
2	Member of DPR & DPRD	0	0	0	2	7	8	27	5	16	8	9	19	23	20	103	10	257
3	Echelon I/II/III	2	9	15	10	22	14	12	15	8	7	2	7	10	43	24	14	213
4	Other	0	4	1	2	3	4	8	1	2	8	8	3	21	13	31	32	141
5	Mayor/Regent and Deputy	0	0	3	6	6	5	4	3	3	3	12	4	9	13	30	14	115
6	Head of Institution/Ministry	0	1	1	0	1	1	2	0	1	4	9	3	2	0	1	2	28
7	Judge	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	3	2	3	1	3	5	0	22
8	Governor	1	0	2	1	1	2	1	0	0	2	3	3	1	1	2	1	21
9	Lawyer	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	4	1	12
10	Prosecutor	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	3	10
11	Commissioner	0	3	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
12	Corporation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	1	6
13	Ambassador	0	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
14	Police	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Amount		4	23	29	27	55	45	65	38	49	60	61	62	99	123	260	127	1125

Sumber: KPK Organization. (2019).

The data shows that corruption in the executive ranks first as many as 379 people (Echelon I/II/III, 213 people; Mayor/Regent & Deputy, 115 people; Head of Institution/Ministry 28 people; Governor 21 people; and 2 police officers). The second rank is from the public (private sector, 287 people, corporations, 6 people) as many as 293 people. While the legislature (DPR&DPRD) is in third place with 257 people, while the judiciary is in fourth place with 32 people (judges, 22 people and 10 prosecutors).

The impact is bad on public services, public goods and public services and administrative services, creates inefficiency, increases crime, slows growth, and worsens the image and national investment climate at a macro level. The impact was so severe that the UN convention on eradicating corruption, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), which Indonesia had ratified, recommended that countries criminalize bribery in the private sector (Marbun, 2017). During the Orde Baru era until its fall, the executive dominance of corrupt behavior was neatly stored in documents that were only known to the ruling regime. Whatever the results of the Supreme Audit Agency's examination will depend on the tastes of Suharto, the holder of power in the Orde Baru era.

In 2014 online law identified 10 active governors entangled in corruption, namely Annas Maamun (Riau Governor), Ratu Atut Chosiyah (Banten Governor), Romi Hertan (Palembang Mayor), Bonaran Situmeang (Central Tapanuli Regent), Ilham Arief Sirajuddin (Mayor of Palembang). Makassar), Rachmat Yasin (Bogor Regent), Ade Swara (Karawang Regent), Raijua Marthin Luther Dira Tome (Sabu Regent), Zaini Arony



(West Lombok Regent), Numfor Yesaya Sombuk (Biak Regent) (Hukumonline.com, 2015). Of the 10 regional heads, the cases that ensnared him were related to bribery in pilkada issues, licensing and the purchase of goods & services. The KPK has also named six corporations as suspects, namely PT Duta Graha Indah, PT Tuah Sejati, PT Nindya Karya, PT Merial Esa, PT Tradha and PT Palma Satu. " In 2017, The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) identified PT DGI (Duta Graha Indah) as a suspect in a fraudulent act committed during the construction of the Udayana Education Hospital for the 2009–2011 Fiscal Year (Antara, 2019).

At the regional level, changes to the system allow the executive to be impeached by the legislature through the accountability mechanism at the end of the fiscal year and accountability at the end of the term of office (PP No. 3/2007 and PP No. 108/2000). As a result, the executive seems to give in and the wheels of government are relatively politically controlled by the legislature from planning to implementation. At its peak, most members of the legislature fell into corruption cases in congregation. This phenomenon can be seen in the cases of DPRD Southeast Sulawesi, Banten and West Sumatra for the period 1999-2004. In general, there are 257 members of the DPR/D who stumbled on corruption, where a number of legislative members were forced to return the incentive communication allowance funds as a result of the unclear implementation of PP. 24 of 2004. Two government regulations, namely PP No. 36 and PP No. 21, which clarified this interpretation, still created polemics and tensions between the DPRD for the 1999-2004 period and the Ministry of Home Affairs.

After the reformation period (2004-2009), the symptoms of corruption entered a new phase at the level of the central bureaucracy and Senayan in particular. The Hambalang corruption case by several members of the DPR (2012) and a number of important officials at the Ministry of Youth and Sports became a new chapter in the transition of corruption from lower levels to higher levels, after previously starting with the arrests of a number of senior politicians in almost all representatives of political parties for cases of corruption. corruption in the period 2004-2009 and 2009-2014.

For the central bureaucracy, we can take the example of corruption cases in three strategic ministries, namely the ministries of health, education, and religion. Since 2010-2012 the three ministries have been plagued by corruption problems. The former Minister of Health for the years 2004 to 2009 was involved in the Ministry of Health's case about the purchase of medical facilities. Symptoms of corruption in the ministry of education are more in the tender for the procurement of books to the School Operational Assistance (BOS) fund. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Religion is also under public pressure regarding the transparency of the management of the Ummah's endowment fund, the pilgrimage to tenders for the procurement of the Qur'anic manuscripts in 2011 and 2012 as well as the Madrasah computer laboratory. The diversity of types of corruption that occur both in the executive, legislative and judicial domains as well as in the community can be seen in table 2 below.

**Table 2.** Crimes of Corruption by Type of Case

Case	Year																				Amount
	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22		
Procurement of Goods/Services	2	12	8	14	18	16	16	10	8	9	15	14	14	15	17	18	27	30	11	274	
Licensing	0	0	5	1	3	1	0	0	0	3	5	1	1	2	1	0	0	2	0	25	
Bribery	0	7	2	4	13	12	19	25	34	50	20	38	79	93	168	119	55	65	63	867	
Charges	0	0	7	2	3	0	0	0	0	1	6	1	1	0	4	1	0	0	1	27	
Budget Abuse	0	0	5	3	10	8	5	4	3	0	4	2	1	1	0	2	6	3	0	57	
TPPU	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	7	5	1	3	8	6	5	3	7	4	49	
Obstructing the KPK Process	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	3	0	0	2	3	0	0	1	0	11	
Amount	2	19	27	24	47	37	40	39	48	70	58	57	99	121	199	145	91	108	79	1310	

Source: (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, 2023)

Table 2 shows that the type of corruption in bribery ranks first, procurement of goods and services is followed by budget mismanagement, offenses related to money laundering, levies, permits, and lastly impeding the KPK procedure. One of the policies of the Jokowi government to carry out reforms in the field of law is the formation of the Illegal Charges Saber Team (Pungli). The leading sectors are the Attorney General's Office and Kemenpan & RB. This extortion saber will monitor the public service sector from Aceh to Papua. The service sector monitored starts from making KTP, SKCK, STNK, SIM, BPKB, loading and unloading permits for port goods and a number of permits in various other ministries (University of Muhammadiyah Malang, 2016). The type of levy corruption ranks fifth, in fact the type of licensing that has been discussed as an obstacle in investing only ranks sixth out of seven types of corruption identified by the KPK.

The seven types of corruption can be identified as follows:

### **Bribery**

The gap in the types of bribery corruption can be mapped as follows: a) Bribes related to promotion and transfer of positions in the bureaucracy were carried out by regional heads who ensnared, among others, Nyono Suharli Wihandoko (Regent of Jombang), Taufiqurrahman (Regent of Nganjuk), Ibnu Hajar (Head of the Education and Culture Office of the Nganjuk Regency Government), Suwandi (Head of SMP Negeri 3 Kabupaten Ngronggot), Nganjuk), and Sri Hartini (Regent of Klaten); b) Bribery related to the authority of a political party to run for district head ensnared Luthfi Hasan Ishaq (President of PKS); c) Bribery related to the discussion of the APBD-P was carried out by members of the legislature who ensnared Jarot Edy Sulistiyono and Moch. Arief Wicaksono (Chairman of the Malang City DPRD); d) Aditya Anugrah Moha and Sudiwardono were involved as judges at the Manado High Court regarding bribery related to the handling of an appeal on behalf of the defendant Marlina Moha Siahaan in the Village Government Apparatus Income Allowance (TPAPD) corruption case in Bolaang Mongondow Regency in 2010. Bribery related to the Palembang City Regional Election dispute at the Constitutional Court in 2013 arrested Romi Hertan (Mayor of Palembang), Masyito (wife of the Mayor of Palembang) and M. Akil Mochtar (Chairman of the Constitutional Court); e) Bribes related to project tenders ensnare Sujendi Tarsono with OK. Arya Zulkarnain (Regent of Batubara) from 2013 to 2018 and Helman Herdady (Head of PUPR of Batubara Regency. Bribery related to the budgeting of the Kedungkandang Bridge Construction project in the Malang City Government APBD ensnared Hendrawan Maruszama Commissioner of PT Enfys Nusantara Karya for being

bribed and Moch Arief Wicaksono (Chairman of the Malang City DPRD) Period 2014-2019 Bribery Related to Project Bribery in South Bengkulu Regency Fiscal Year 2018 Dirwan Mahmud (Regent of South Bengkulu) 2016-2021 Period Agus Feisal Hidayat (Regent of South Buton) was caught in a bribery case related to projects in the district from 2017 to 2022. Syahri Mulyo (Regent Tulungagung) was implicated in corruption related to work projects in the Tulungagung Regency Government from 2013 to 2018. In relation to bribes related to work projects in the Blitar City Government which ensnared Muh. Samanhudi Anwar (Mayor of Blitar) for the 2016-2021 period. Bribery related to projects in Jambi Province ensnared d Zumi Zola Zulkifli ( Governor of Jambi), Pangonal Harahap (Regent of Labuhanbatu North Sumatra) and Umar Ritonga te caught in a bribery case related to a project within the Labuhanbatu Regency Government for the 2018 Fiscal Year. Bribery related to a work project in the South Buton Regency Government ensnared Agus Feisal Hidayat (Regent of South Buton) for the 2017-2022 period. Bribes related to work projects at the Blitar City Government ensnared Purnomo, Susilo Prabowo alias Embun. Bribes related to work projects in the Tulungagung Regency Government ensnared Syahri Mulyo (Tulungagung Regent) for the 2013-2018 period, Agung Prayitno and Sutrisno. Bribery at the initiative of the Bengkulu Provincial Government for the 2017 fiscal year ensnared Ridwan Mukti (Governor of Bengkulu Province) and Lily Martiani Maddari, Jhony Wijaya, and Rico Diansari; f) Bribery related to the Examination of the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK-RI) on the Financial Statements of the Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration for the 2016 Fiscal Year which ensnared Rochmadi Saptogiri and Ali Sadli; g) Bribery related to the ratification of the Jambi Province RAPBD which then dragged Zumi Zola (Governor of Jambi) and 11 DPRD members in the same province. Apart from Governor Saipudin, Erwan Malik, Arfan also ensnared the ratification of the Jambi Province RAPBD for the 2018 Fiscal Year. Dian Lestari Subekti Pertiwi, Sigit Widodo, Yudhy Tri Hartanto, Adi Pandoyo, Basikun Suwandin Atmojo alias Petruk, and Hartoyo are all involved in the 2016 Kebumen Regency APBD-P for accepting bribes related to the discussion and approval of the project budget at the Office of Education and Sports (Dikpora). Bribery related to the stipulation of a Regional Regulation on Additional Equity Participation in Banjarmasin Regional Drinking Water Company in 2017, ensnared Iwan Rusmali, Andi Effendi, Muslih and Trensisi.

#### **Procurement of Goods and Services.**

Corruption in the purchase of products and services is still a widespread and routine activity, such as: a. the procurement of Electronic KTPs at the Ministry of Home Affairs ensnared Andi Agustinus Narogong, Sugiharto (Commitment Making Officer / PPK), Irman (Director General of Population and Civil Registration of the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs), and Setya Novanto; b. the procurement of urea tablet fertilizer at Perum Perhutani unit 1 Central Java ensnared Librato El Arif and Heru Siswanto, Asep Sudrajat Sanusi, Teguh Hadi Siswanto, and Bambang Wuryanto; c. the procurement of goods and services in Batu City for the 2017 Fiscal Year ensnared Eddy Rumpoko (Mayor of Batu) and Edi Setiawan; d. the procurement of Satellite Monitoring at Bakamla RI in the 2016 APBN-P, ensnare Nofel Hasan, Eko Susilo Hadi and Bambang Udoyo; e. procurement of goods and services in the City of Tegal for the 2017 Fiscal Year, ensnaring Eddy Rumpoko (Mayor of Batu); f. the procurement of goods and services in the City of Tegal for the 2017 Fiscal Year ensnared Siti Mashita Soeparno (Mayor of Tegal); g. the procurement of goods and services within the Ngada Regency has ensnared Marianus Sae (Regent of Ngada) for the 2010-2015 and 2016-2021 periods; h. the procurement of goods and services within the Kendari City Government for the 2017-2018 Fiscal Year ensnared Adriatma Dwi Putra (Mayor of Kendari, Central Sulawesi), Asrun and Fatmawaty Faqih; i. procurement of goods and services in the 2016-2021 Kebumen Regency APBD ensnares Mohammad Yahya Fuad (Regent of Kebumen) for the 2016-2021 period; j. the procurement of goods and services within the



Purbalingga Regency Government ensnared Tasdi (Purbalingga Regent) for the 2016-2021 period; k. procurement of goods and services within the South Lampung Regency Government to ensnare Zainudin Hasan (Regent of South Lampung) for the 2016-2021 period; l. The procurement of goods and services within the Pasuruan City Government for the 2018 Fiscal Year ensnared Muhamad Baqir.

### **Budget Misuse**

a. Budget abuse in the Management of Funds and Services at Kardinah Hospital, Tegal City in 2017 enlisted Amir Mirza Hutagalung and Siti Mashita Soeparno (Mayor of Tegal City); b. Abuse of authority in using Out-of-School Education funds ensnared Marthen Dira Tome in NTT Province; c. Misuse of budget in the construction activities of the Athlete's House and Multipurpose Building for the South Sumatra Provincial Government and the Construction of a Special Teaching Hospital for Infectious Diseases and Tourism at Udayana University ensnaring Dudung Purwadi (private); d. misuse of the budget in the management of capitation funds in the National Health Insurance Program at the Subang District Health Office for Fiscal Year 2014 ensnared Ojang Sohendi, Jajang Abdul Holik, Fahri Nurmollo, Deviyanti Rochaeni and Lenih Marlani

### **Money Laundering**

a. Rochmadi Saptogiri who was worried about Ali Sadli, Sub Auditor III B2 BPK RI, hiding or falsifying sources of wealth, was arrested by TPPU; b. The TPPU also ensnared Ojang Sohendi in relation to the placement, transfer, purchase, deposit, grant, safekeeping, bringing abroad, changing the form, exchanging it with money or securities, or carrying out other activities related to assets that he knew or were suspected of acting in good faith. acquired through criminal activity. C. TPPU ensnared Zainudin Hasan (Regent of South Lampung) from the proceeds of corruption in the procurement of goods

### **Cost**

Illegal levies ensnared Dwi Jatmiko, a civil servant at the Gunung Kidul Regency Culture Office, DIY. At the time of the arrest, Rp. 9.5 million, although later 9.3 million was handed over to the local government treasury and Rp. 160,000 was returned to the tourism bureau, the person concerned was sentenced to 6 months in prison and a fine of Rp. 20 of 2001 article 3 (Natalia, 2017); b. In the verdict of the Mataran Corruption Court, 3 defendants were found guilty of violating Article 11 Article 55 paragraph (1) of the Criminal Code. Law Number 20 of 2001 concerning Amendments to Law Number 31 of 1999 concerning Eradication of Corruption CrimesH. Silmi was found guilty and sentenced to 4 years in prison, fined Rp. 100 million, and 2 months in prison, citing the role of the NTB Regional Office of the Ministry of Religion Nasrudin in his lawsuit against the demands of the regional office which gave an order to deduct 30% of the funds received from each mosque

### **Licence**

This licensing case ranks sixth out of seven types of corruption inventoried by the KPK. a. Rita Widyasari, Regent of Kutai Kartanegara, was entangled with Location Permits for Nucleus and Oil Palm Plasma Plantations in Kupang Baru Village, Muara Kaman District for the 2010-2015 and 2016-2021 periods; b. The permit for the Meikarta development project in Bekasi Regency ensnared Billy Sindoro, Director of Operations Lippo Group, Lippo Employee Henry Jasmen P. Sitohang, Lippo Group Consultants Taryadi and Fitradjaja Purnama, Neneng Hasanah Yasin (Regent of Bekasi), Jamaludin (Head of the Bekasi PUPR Service), Head Fire Department. Bekasi Regency, Sahat MJB Nahor, Dewi Tisnawati (Head of DPMPSTP Bekasi Regency) and Neneng Rahmi (Head of Spatial Planning for the Bekasi Regency PUPR Service); c. The Licensing and Procurement Project for the Directorate General of Sea Transportation for the 2016–

2017 fiscal year ensnared Antonius Tonny Budiono and Adiputra Kurniawan; d. Nur Alam, Governor of Southeast Sulawesi, was entangled in mining area reserve permits, exploration mining business permits (IUP), and approvals to upgrade mining exploration business permits to production operation mining business permits granted to PT. Anugrah Harisma Barakah in the province; e. The permit for the construction of the Transmart Mall in Cilegon ensnared Tubagus Iman Ariyadi (Mayor of Cilegon), Hendri and Akhmad Dita Prawira; f. the licensing of PT Pura Binaka Mandiri and PT Alfa Sentra Properti ensnared Miftahuddin to Imas Aryumningsih (Regent of Subang) for the 2017-2018 period and Asep Santika (Head of Subang Regency DPMPSTP Licensing Division); g. permits for the provision of facilities and other grants at Class I Sukamiskin Correctional Institution ensnare Hendry Saputra, et al. (Komisi Pemberantas Korupsi, 2019).

### **Obstructing the KPK Process**

On behalf of the defendants Irman (Director General of Population and Civil Registration of the Ministry of Home Affairs) and Sugiharto (Commitment Making Officer (PPK) of the Directorate General of Population and Civil Registration of the Ministry of Home Affairs), Miryam S. Haryani is one of the types of obstructing the KPK process, which is meant by deliberately concealing or provide incorrect information in trials of Corruption Crime cases; b. Fredrich Yunadi Alias Fredy Junadi together with Bimanesh Sutarjo deliberately prevented, obstructed, or thwarted the alleged corruption in the procurement of Electronic KTPs from 2011 to 21012, the defendant named Setya Novanto. (Komisi Pemberantas Korupsi, 2019).

The cases that have legal force according to the KPK, from 2006-2018 are as follows:

**Table 3.** Cases that have Permanent Legal Force (Inkrah)

No	Instansi	Tahun																Jlh
		06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	
1	Pengadilan Negeri	5	9	9	20	20	21	8	10	20	16	43	71	94	113	66	59	605
3	Pengadilan Tinggi	3	0	0	2	3	0	3	10	7	6	13	5	10	11	9	80	79
2	Mahkamah Agung	9	14	14	17	11	13	7	20	13	15	14	8	5	18	34	27	239
	Jumlah	17	23	23	39	34	34	28	40	40	37	70	84	109	142	109	94	952

Sumber: Komisi Pemberantas Korupsi, (2022).

If seen in table 3, the defendants who submitted an appeal at the district court level who filed an appeal were 18.02% while those who filed a cassation were 50%. The number of cassations should not have happened, According to studies by the Institute for the Study and Advocacy of Judicial Independence, this is accurate that as many as 92 decisions that fall into the criteria for cases that should not be appealed (Lembaga Kajian dan Advokasi Independensi Peradilan, 2015).

This study will photograph and describe the main variables of corruption gaps in government in Indonesia, which have moved in 2006-2018 based on data from the KPK. These variables include bribery, procurement of goods/services, budget abuse, money laundering, levies, permits, and obstruction of the KPK process, which, in the author's opinion, are very important in the expansion and development of post-reform corruption. The hope is that it can recommend a corruption control system so that it can reduce corruption in Indonesia.

## **DISCUSSION**

### **Types of corruption Bribery, Procurement of goods, Licensing, Money laundering and obstructing the KPK process**

The loophole of corruption through bribery by the private sector ranks first in Indonesia. The private sector bribery, however, has not yet been classified as a criminal act of corruption in Indonesia, so it cannot be charged with the Corruption Eradication Act. However, before the birth of UNCAC, Indonesia had already criminalized bribery in the private sector, through Law No. 11 of 1980. This provision was almost never used because of systemic problems, affecting the reluctance of law enforcers to implement the regulation (Marbun, 2017). As a result, corruption is always rampant and comes into contact with state officials both in the executive, legislative and judicial realms. This type of bribery corruption is actually closely related to other types of corruption, such as the procurement of goods and services in order to be won in tenders and to get a project someone must bribe the Regent as happened in the case of the Regent of Batubara for the 2013-2018 period, the Head of PUPR for the Regency of Batubara, and Arief Wicaksono to get approval. the re-budgeting of the Kedungkandang Bridge Construction project in the Malang City Government Budget from Hendrawan Maruszama Commissioner of PT. Enfys Nusantara Karya. Bribery is a crime, in the opinion of experts the perpetrators of crimes must be held responsible (Sari, 2017). The impact of this bribery is very detrimental to the state, because the funds that should be allocated to the community become private benefits.

Bribery is also related to licensing; bribes are carried out in order to obtain a permit from the authorized official. At the executive level, for example, the authorization for the Meikarta construction project in the Bekasi Region and the construction of the Transmart Mall in Cilegon ensnared Tubagus Iman Ariyadi, Hendri and Akhmad Dita Prawira and the Regent of Subang for the 2013-2018 period and the Head of Subang DPMPSTP licensing in granting PT Pura Binaka Mandiri and PT Alfa permits. Property Center. At the legislative level, there was a bribery case in the approval of the budget which involved Moch Arief Wicaksono, the Chairman of the Malang City DPRD. Bribery is done to obtain permits from officials among bureaucrats and also occurs in the context of budget approval which is the legislative domain. This occurs because of the morals of both the bribe and the bribe. Therefore, it is necessary to make efforts to eradicate criminal acts of corruption, especially with the "moral" movement which is continuously socialized that corruption is a great crime against humanity that violates human dignity. Through the moral movement, it is hoped that a social environment will be created that strongly rejects, opposes and punishes acts of corruption and will accept, support and appreciate anti-corruption behavior (Saifuddin, 2017). So far, the Indonesian people are still very permissive towards perpetrators of corruption so that this does not deter them

Corruption loopholes related to licensing also occur in the mining sector which is closely related to the licensing decentralization policy. The first mining licensing corruption case raised by the KPK was a corruption case involving Nur Alam (Governor of Southeast Sulawesi), namely the issuance of PT Anugerah Harisma Barakah (PT AHB) authorization in the form of Approval for Reserved Mining Areas, Approval of Mining Business Permits (IUP) for Exploration and Approval for Increasing IUP Exploration into Production Operation IUP to PT AHB. The value of state losses or the state's economy in this case reaches Rp. 4.3 trillion or at least Rp. 1.5 trillion (KPK in calculating the amount of state losses, from the aspect of the impact of environmental damage at PT AHB's mine site on Kabaena Island). In the mining sector, to obtain permits or contracts, companies have to spend money with sometimes fantastic values. Likewise the forestry sector, through the bribery mode by providing recommendations for exchanging forest areas, submitting revisions to the conversion of forest functions to non-forest areas, and

the application process for the conversion of protected forest functions (Husodo, 2018). There are not a few losses to the state from bribery in the mining and forestry sector, therefore it is necessary to have Whistle-Blowers who have the courage to tell the truth so that it is only natural that Whistle-Blowers must receive legal protection. The problem that is often faced by a Whistle-Blower is not getting appreciation, the lack of support, protection, let alone adequate respect or appreciation for them (Anwar Usman, and A.M. Mujahidin, 2014). Weak guarantees of legal protection for the important role of a Whistle-Blower in the criminal justice process in order to reveal the material truth of a crime, it is necessary to have a legal rule that clearly and explicitly regulates protection for Whistle-Blowers. The appropriate forms of protection for Whistle-Blowers in the settlement of corruption are: repressive protection; preventive protection; physical and psychological protection; and legal protection (Astuti, 2014)

The act of obstructing the KPK Process carried out by Miryam S. Haryani, in the case of the Corruption Crime on behalf of the Defendants Irman and Sugiharto, was an act that hindered and made it difficult for law enforcement parties, it is appropriate that the person concerned should be given a sanction. Likewise, Fredrich Yunadi alias Fredy Junadi and Bimanesh Sutarjo intentionally prevented, hindered, or thwarted the alleged corruption in the procurement of Electronic ID cards in 2011 - 2012 with the suspect Setya Novanto. At the judicial level, bribery cases occurred in order to be given leniency in the sentence that ensnared Sudiwardono (Judge at the Manado High Court). In addition Bribes were given in the corruption case involving the Village Government Apparatus Income Allowance (TPAPD) in Bolaang Mongondow Regency in order to handle appeals on favor of the defendant Marlina Moha Siahaan. Article 21 of Law Number 31 of 1999 as amended by Law No. 20/2001 concerning the Eradication of Corruption, any person who intentionally prevents, obstructs or thwarts directly or indirectly the investigation, prosecution and examination in court of a suspect or accused or witnesses in corruption cases, shall be punished with imprisonment for a minimum of 3 (three) years and a maximum of 12 (twelve) years

The bribery loophole related to money laundering offenses occurred in the case of bribery in the Lebak Banten PILKADA bribery case at the Constitutional Court, which ensnared Akil Muhtar (Chairman of the Constitutional Court) and Tubagus Chaeri alias Wawan (brother of Banten Governor Ratu Atut Chosiyah). Money laundering is done to cover up or misrepresent the sources of illegal funds. In order to uncover the money laundering case, the role of the whistleblower is needed so that it can be detected and exposed. However, in practice it is not easy because whistleblowers do not get protection, because normatively based on Law No. 13/2006 article 10 paragraph 2, the existence of whistleblowers has no place to get legal protection, so they are at high risk and risk their lives, let alone expecting to get appreciation and respect. appreciation. The whistleblower must be a person who is completely clean of corrupt behavior, otherwise it will become a boomerang for himself as happened to Komjen Susno Duadji regarding the Cicak vs. Crocodile case. The reward for Whistle-Blowers in the country of Indonesia has not been satisfactory for the community as in the case of Komjen Susno Duadji, but lately they are satisfied with the Judge's decision in the Ferdy Sambo case against Richard Eliezer's decision. Therefore, the right form of protection for Whistle-Blowers in the settlement of criminal acts of corruption such as repressive protection; preventive protection; physical and psychological protection; and legal protection (Astuti, 2014) is very important to implement.

The easiest area of corruption to manipulate is in the purchasing of goods and services. Therefore, it is necessary to form an independent auction committee by involving the community as its members, so that it is not only dominated by the government as is the case today. The process must be transparent, and apply the principles of good

governance. 85% of regional leaders' corruption has a role in the procurement of goods and services through bids. If you pay attention, The annual contract for the purchase of products and services has a very high value, especially given that numerous parties (contractors) are involved in the implementation of tenders, which presents potential for bribery, extortion, or other types of illicit payments. Bribes became the predominant method as high-ranking officials and contractors turned to illicit payments to secure contracts and concessions as a source of profit. The use of bribery to get goods and services technically serves a purpose. First, businesses are prepared to pay to be on the pre-qualification list and to limit bidders. Second, businesses are prepared to pay for insider information about projects. Third, illegal payments allow officials to regulate tender specifications so that the paying company will be the only supplier that passes the prequalification. Fourth, the goal of illicit payments is to obtain contracts. This bribery resulted in price inflation so that the impact on the community was in the form of a reduction in the standard of the products and services produced, so that people felt betrayed by their own choices. Based on Presidential Decree No. 80 of 2003 concerning the Procurement of Government Goods/Services, a project value above Rp 50 million must go through a tender mechanism. From ICW's findings, there were 43 cases in the regions that indicated corruption in the goods and services procurement sector with direct appointment mode. In addition to indications of corruption through direct appointments, other modes of corruption include mark-ups, extortion, contract irregularities, and fictitious projects. The many modes of corruption that occur in the procurement of goods and services sector show the poor system of accountability and transparency of the government, and the ineffectiveness of an effective prevention system to minimize the occurrence of corrupt practices. Loppa's opinion (2001:85), even though officials want to commit corruption, if it is not welcomed by businessmen in the form of giving bribes or promises to give rewards, corruption will not be as bad as it is today. Almost all government entities have many stages and procedures where corrupt practices in the procurement of products and services might be seen. These phases consist of: First, the stage of needs evaluation and decision, which is frequently not advantageous to the community. Additionally, there is a financial decision that is unfair because it only benefits a certain group of product suppliers. For facilitating the award of contracts, local governments and DPRD members are compensated in the financial budget (usually through certain pre-agreements with contractors). Lawmakers are influenced by interested parties who have conflicts of interest to the point where the tender procedure puts pressure on the tender committee. Second, the method used to develop and create the tender documents is one in which the guidelines or tender documents are created to favor one of the contractors, so that it could be ensured that there is no competition during the tender. Another strategy is to alter the quantity of goods or services required in order to advantage some contractors. The complexity of the project was purposefully left out of the tender materials and instructions in order to distract the supervisors and conceal unscrupulous plans. This stage also often involves consultants to make project plans to benefit several bidders. Finally, the local government seems to have abused the direct appointment premise. Third, efforts where policy makers behave unfairly (because they are paid, anticipate money to be praised) or where there is a conflict of interest are made during the stage of choosing participants and choosing the winner of the tender. To make it simpler for policymakers to take over their jobs in the areas, selection is made using rather arbitrary criteria. Profit-seeking local government officials often provide confidential information before bidding begins, thereby benefiting one or more of the bidders. Of course, not every bidder received the same information. Misuse of confidentiality, especially the dissemination of secret documents, makes the task of monitoring and supervision challenging. The only stage that can be said to be fair is the stage of selecting the winner of the tender is to publicize through particular newspapers. Additionally, there is a lot of corruption when paying a large amount does not guarantee success. These costs are in most cases



unaccountable. Fourth, the implementation stage of the work, the contractor uses a lower price of goods, The quality does not match the agreed-upon contract requirements. Due to the need for repairs, the work is more expensive than it should be. Worse, contract renegotiation or replacement of basic contract clauses is carried out by field supervisors and implementers who have been rewarded sufficiently so that they cannot be independent, which in the end they make false reports or falsify reports that are not in accordance with actual conditions. As a result, renegotiation or the addition of substantial changes to the contract render the tender process futile. On the other hand, the impact of budget swelling at the end of the year creates a gap for corruption in the purchase of goods and services, such as: first, urgent spending at the end of the fiscal year is often the subject of corruption. The apparatus spends it on programs and activities that are not very clear. Second, the procurement of goods and services when a disaster occurs is at risk of corruption, because of the large amount of funds and must be spent quickly to overcome humanitarian. Although local governments are proactive in implementing the law on public information disclosure, weak implementation opens opportunities to manipulate information so that perpetrators are not judged by the public (terror by press). Fifth, the tendency to determine certain tender participants risks reducing the level of fairness in the process of procuring goods and services and is usually followed by an increase in purchasing costs. If bidders have been determined, making sure the procedure is carried out in a neat and straightforward manner is crucial and follows administrative regulations according to applicable regulations. At this stage the return on capital starts to be done slowly.

The income of state officials is actually more than sufficient, but because of the weak faith of the corruptors and the lack of gratitude and satisfaction, it causes them to commit corruption, coupled with the spirit of consumerism which is exemplified by officials and their relatives, for example the former Governor of Banten Ratu Atut Chosiyah buying a bag the price of a house from foreign production which should be an example for the people he leads. No less important is the cause of corruption due to weak supervision from the community and law enforcement also encourages corruption. Moreover, the recruitment of state officials and civil servants who do not pay attention to personal integrity and devotion to God Almighty has not received the main portion, even though this is a crucial foundation for selecting state representatives and other civil servants who would preserve honesty.

The division of power between the executive, legislature and judiciary is designed to achieve a balance in managing the state so that one with the other can perform their respective roles, especially the role as a supervisor in order to be able to enforce and not otherwise participate in corruption. At the executive level, in carrying out its role, the public often disappoints because the legislative and even judicial institutions are not functioning. We can see this from the behavior of the three institutions that do not have a commitment to eradicating corruption, as evidenced by data from the KPK, which has signed up, from these three institutions. The DPR, which has a supervisory function, has the duty and authority to supervise the implementation of government policies and follow up on the results of supervision (Article 20A of the 1945 Constitution, the DPR RI has legislative, budgetary and oversight functions) often does not work as it should, this adds to the spread of corruption to date.

### **Budget Abuse**

APBD/N has a very strategic function. However, the misuse of the budget, both APBD/N, is actually carried out by people who are supposed to guard these funds to the public. The author believes that the eradication of corruption can work if the leader has a strong will, this is just the opposite. The absence of a role model for both the Regent/Mayor, the Governor and the head of the agency will increase the proliferation of corruptors at the

grassroots level. The mode of misuse of the APBD in general includes efforts to increase/enlarge budget items. Although the budget line's growth is not directly tied to corruption, the regional head's consent makes it possible for him or her to be accountable for this issue. For example, the budget ceiling for incentive communication allowances for council members as regulated in PP No. 24/2004 on Protocol and Financial Positions for DPRD Leaders and Members is only limited by general principles such as equality, tiered, proportional, reasonable, logical and rational. Such principles lead to interpretations and improvisations among local governments so that they are decided through mutually beneficial compromises. Budget flexibility is also carried out by taking advantage of the prevailing price disparity in a location, including increasing the budget in the "unexpected needs" list. Such budget allocations are usually entrusted to the household in the form of tactical funds. In the mode of using APBD which is channeled through fictitious foundations, elected regional heads who usually come from the majority party collaborate with DPRD members to distribute social assistance and grants to a number of community organizations that were formed from the start. The beneficiary groups were deliberately mobilized to receive aid, although the flow of funds ultimately flowed into the pockets of regional heads, party administrators, success teams and members of the council. This condition has prompted the issuance of Permendagri 32 of 2011 concerning Guidelines for Grants and Social Assistance. This provision regulates and limits the distribution of grants and social assistance to community organizations through various conditions. The swelling of the APBD/N on official travel expenses for employees has generally reached a dangerous area. Manipulation of official travel is carried out through the mode of increasing consultation activities, workshops, education and training, comparative studies and technical guidance. The government appears to think that the best defense against the threat of corruption is the usage of APBD/N during official trips. These techniques result from the lack of instruments that control the number of business trips each week, month, or year.

Unaccounted for and unprocedural use of the remaining budget, as well as deviations from procedures for submission and disbursement of regional treasury funds, provide opportunities for manipulation of the rest of the APBD and manipulation in the procurement process in several districts/cities and provinces. This can be seen in the case of the former regent and deputy regent of Pati in the 2003 APBD corruption and the former regent of East Lampung Satono and the case of the former governor of Gorontalo for the 2007-2012 period who allegedly violated procedures in allocating the remaining APBD funds to members of the Gorontalo Provincial DPRD. The vacancy of the distribution of the remaining APBD as well as the situation leading up to the post-conflict local election as well as political pressure from the DPRD encouraged regional heads to take pragmatic actions. The distribution of the remaining APBD is carried out through legal stipulations in the form of regional regulations and regional head decisions. The purpose of budget allocation, which is to boost the economy's productivity and effectiveness while reducing unemployment and resource waste, has shifted to budget allocation for individuals and groups close to power. The distribution function, which should focus on a concept of fairness and propriety, instead produces injustice and improper behavior. The warning signs include the concentration of wealth in a group of people, the suffering of many people, and the elites of local government engaging in extravagant conduct. In addition, the function of income distribution, especially in an effort to enhance community welfare, has turned into an effort to enhance the welfare of local government representatives. The purpose of economic stabilization, which the Regional Budget should be a means of preserving and attempting to balance the area economy's fundamentals, has actually created a deficit in a number of regional governments. The results of the 2007 BPK examination showed that there was a regional cash deficit of Rp. 106.61 billion in East Aceh District. In Purwakarta Regency there is evidence of a fictitious payment receipt for the daily food and drink costs of the regional

secretary of Rp. 11.86 billion. In 2009, out of 3,051 cases found, there was a state loss of 9.93 trillion. Of the 556 cases there were regional losses of 310.86 billion. based on the evaluation's BPK results, there were 191 regions with a disclaimer assessment, 8 regions that were not fair, 110 regions that were fair with exceptions, and 1 region with the status of unqualified (BPK data for 2007 and 2009). The wheels of local government are running slowly due to apparatus spending that exceeds the resilience of its economic fundamentals. The authorization function, which should make the APBD as the basis for carrying out revenues and expenditures, has now become a deliberately legitimized basis as a model for public perception campaigns to legitimize corruption. The purpose of APBD planning, which should be a guideline for management in arranging activities, has turned into the foundation for coordinating local governments', DPRD's, and political parties' interests. The APBD inspection's function, that serves as a guideline for evaluating regional government administration activities, has become complicated due to the regional head's and DPRD's desires. The purpose of instrumentation in Making economic and social justice now only benefits local governments. In the presence of elitist interests, the purpose of government administration in the form of services, development, and empowerment has stagnated. The stimulus function within the framework of economic growth is far from being expected. The function of accommodating the interests of the community is dealing with the interests of the bureaucracy. Eventually, the role of political power in advancing society is diminished and replaced by its role in advancing the party.

### **Charges**

The type of levy corruption ranks fifth as a loophole for corruption. Cases of illegal levies occurred because of someone who backed up or ordered to carry out these activities, such as the case of retribution levies which had already committed and ensnared Dwi Jatmiko, a civil servant at the Culture Service of Gunung Kidul Regency, DIY. This is proven by the results of the levy being paid to the Head of the Office and the Tourism Bureau, while only getting Rp. 40,000, - not comparable to the sentence of 6 months in prison and a fine of Rp. 500,000, -.

The collection of funds for the reconstruction of the mosque after the Lombok earthquake, NTB, in the Mataram Corruption Court's decision ensnared 3 defendants, who previously in the trial H. Silmi had been sentenced to 4 years in prison and fined 100 million subsidiary 2 months in prison stating an order from Nasrudin (Head of Regional Office of the Ministry of Religion NTB), cut 30% of the funds received from each mosque. A Head of the NTB Ministry of Religion Regional Office, who was supposed to oversee the implementation of the mosque construction, actually committed corruption in the midst of the suffering of the people.

### **CONCLUSION**

Types of corruption such as bribery, procurement of goods and services, licensing and money laundering, are interrelated with each other and create gaps in corruption at the executive, legislative and judicial levels. To provide a deterrent effect, it is necessary to give severe sanctions, namely life sentences or death sentences. The death penalty does not violate human rights, it is corruptors who violate human rights against the people who have entrusted them. Those who have been involved in corruption should no longer be given the opportunity to nominate as regional heads or members of the DPR/DPRD/DPD, let alone the President and Vice President. When purchasing products and services, the auction committee must involve an independent (community) and transparent process and apply the principles of good governance.

Anyone who is involved in misuse of the budget, must be dismissed as a civil servant, and those involved in it if it is related to a private company can be done through revocation of business license. The perpetrators of illegal levies, especially intellectual actors, must be given strict sanctions. It is necessary to review all regulations governing corruption. The need for protection against whistleblowers is stated in regulations so that it becomes a culture of society to eradicate corruption to its roots.

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In this paper there is no conflict of interest by author.

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